Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster
THIRD EDITION

Edited by
Dee Wood Harpur / Kelly Frail
WHEN HATE IS A CRIME: TEMPOARAL AND GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS OF ANTI-ISLAMIC HATE CRIME AFTER 9/11

Lori Peek and Michelle Meyer

Introduction

The attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 represent an important case for those interested in the study of crime and disaster. As Frailing and Harper observe in this volume, 9/11 is an event in which “the disaster itself is the crime.” We would add that 9/11 is also worthy of consideration because the principal crime — the terrorist attacks — prompted a nationwide surge in additional criminal activity in the form of retaliatory hate crimes against Muslims, Arabs and members of other religious and ethnic minority groups (for overviews, see Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009, Cainkar 2009, Peek 2011, Welch 2006).

Although much has been written about the post-9/11 anti-Muslim and anti-Arab backlash, this scholarship has, for the most part, not been included in the ongoing debates regarding the hotly contested question of whether or not disasters result in increased criminal activity (Frailing 2007, Quarantelli 2007). Hate crime is worthy of scholarly attention and public concern but most contemporary crime and disaster literature focuses on a limited range of criminal behaviors (e.g., looting, property crime) perpetrated during the impact and emergency phases in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters (see Thornton and Voigt in this volume). This narrow emphasis has resulted in a major divide in the research literature, where those in one camp contend that disasters
strenthen norms of reciprocity and altruism and lead to a reduction or stabilization in rates of crime, while the other side argues that disasters weaken mechanisms of formal and informal social control, giving rise to criminal opportunities and increased rates of unlawful behavior (see Zahran, Shelley, Peek and Brody 2009).

Of course, the real world is much more complex than the aforementioned arguments would suggest. For instance, the 9/11 attacks led to only limited and highly localized incidents of looting (McEntire, Robinson and Weber 2003) and were followed by declining rates of crime against persons and property in lower Manhattan and in New York City public schools (Downtown Alliance 2006, Gendar 2002). But the attacks also resulted in an escalation in individual disaster assistance fraud cases (Fraiilin in this volume) and an unprecedented spike in anti-Islamic and anti-Arab hate crime in the United States (Peek 2011) and in other countries as well (Hanes and Machin 2014). So where would 9/11 fit within the two previously described camps? The prior examples illustrate that "either-or" type questions regarding whether or not disasters promote criminal activity simply do not do justice to the various forms of crime that may be expressed across the disaster life cycle.

With this context in mind, the goal of this chapter is to highlight the immediate and longer-term differential vulnerability of religious and ethnic minorities to hate crime following terrorist incidents. The social and criminological consequences of terrorism, as a type of disaster, and hate crime, as a specific manifestation of post-terrorism backlash, have both been underrepresented in the crime and disaster literature (Fraiilin and Harper in this volume, Voigt and Thornton in this volume). In this chapter, we address this gap by drawing on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hate crime data to explore pre- and post-9/11 temporal and geographic patterns of anti-Islamic hate crime. We begin by defining and discussing the distinguishing characteristics of hate crime. We then detail our methodological approach and outline six key themes that we discovered in our analysis. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings, with a special focus on the role that law enforcement and emergency management agencies may play in mitigating post-disaster hate crime.

When Hate Is a Crime

In the U.S., where the protection of freedom of speech and other civil liberties is fundamental to the nation's democratic principles, hate itself is not a crime. Hate can become a crime, however, when a more traditional offense—like arson, aggravated assault, vandalism or intimidation—is perpetrated with
the added element of bias. The U.S. Congress defines hate crime as “a criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, ethnicity or sexual orientation.” In a hate crime, a victim is intentionally selected based on the perpetrator’s prejudice against the actual or perceived status of the targeted individual (Craig 2002). In short, the offense is committed against a member of a specific group, simply because of his or her membership in that group (Alexander 2000).

In some cases, it is simple and straightforward to determine whether or not a particular criminal act is a hate crime. For instance, in the most brutal acts of violence and intimidation—such as a race-related physical assault where the perpetrators shout racial slurs as they beat their victim and then leave behind symbols of hate such as swastikas or hanging nooses—the bigotry is so blatant that it is impossible to overlook. But sometimes, hate crimes are not always easily labeled as such; the motivation for the crime may be unclear, the victim may be unable or unwilling to report the crime and police may be reluctant, for a variety of reasons, to identify certain offenses as hate crimes (see Levin and McDevitt 2002). Because of the difficulty associated with identifying some hate crimes, the FBI has issued guidance to help local law enforcement agencies determine whether or not an incident is bias motivated. Examples of some of the factors that the FBI (1996: 20–23) recommends that officers consider in making a determination of whether an incident is a suspected hate crime are:

- Was the incident apparently motivated by racial, religious, disability, ethnic or sexual orientation bias?
- Does the victim perceive the action of the offender to have been motivated by bias? Does a substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceive that it was motivated by bias?
- Was the victim of a different race, religion, ability status, ethnicity or sexual orientation than the offender?
- Were any biased verbal comments, written statements or gestures made by the offender which indicates his or her bias?
- Were bias-related drawings, markings, symbols or graffiti left at the crime scene?
- Did the incident coincide with a holiday or other day of significance to the victim's or offender’s group? Was the victim engaged in activities promoting his or her race, religion, disability, ethnicity or sexual orientation?

Is the offender a member of a hate group? Has the offender been previously involved in other hate-related crime?

What do the demographics of the area suggest about the incident? Is the victim living in a neighborhood where he or she is overwhelmingly outnumbered by other residents of a different race, ethnicity or sexual orientation, for example? Was the victim visiting such an area when the incident took place? Have other hate crimes occurred in the same area?

The FBI acknowledges that these factors, by themselves, do not confirm that any given episode was a hate offense, only that additional investigation may be necessary.

Victims commonly face negative consequences from crime. However, some legislators, scholars and advocates for disadvantaged communities have argued that hate crimes represent especially egregious cases warranting enhanced penalties because of their more serious effects on the victims, the larger racial, ethnic, religious, disability, gender or sexual orientation group to which they belong and society as a whole (Herek, Gillis and Cogan 1999). Indeed, a number of characteristics distinguish hate crime from alternate forms of aggression and other types of criminal offenses, including:

1. Hate crimes serve powerful symbolic functions for perpetrators, in that they communicate hatred to an entire group, neighborhood, community or even society (Craig 2002).
2. Because hate crimes are often meant to "send a message" to a specific group of people, the effects of hate crime extend well beyond the immediate victim. Members of the victim's social group may experience fear, intimidation, anger, despair and other forms of vicarious traumatization (Craig-Henderson 2003).
3. As opposed to other types of violent crime, which are most often perpetrated by individuals acting alone, hate crimes are more likely to involve multiple offenders (Levin and McDevitt 2002). In fact, according to one study, more than two-thirds of hate crimes reported to the police involve two or more offenders (Craig 2002) and these perpetrators often viciously attack their victims in a "gang or pack" (Levin and McDevitt 2002: 22).
4. Hate crimes tend to be excessively brutal. When compared with other forms of criminal activity, hate crimes are much more likely to entail personal violence that results in serious physical injury or even death to the victim (Levin and McDevitt 2002).
5. Victims of hate crime are more likely than those victimized in similar non-bias offenses to suffer symptoms of psychological and emo-
tional distress—sleep disturbances, headaches, uncontrollable crying, feelings of isolation, depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation—and for longer periods of time (Burlew and Kocet 2001, Craig-Henderson 2003, Herek, Gillis, Cogan and Glunt 1997, Herek et al. 1999).

(6) Most hate crime victims do not know the identities of their attackers. Victims are chosen, seemingly at random, not because of something they have said or done, but because of an immutable characteristic such as their perceived race or ethnicity (Levin and McDevitt 2002). The fact that victims can do nothing to change what prompted the attack helps explain why these crimes can be so psychologically devastating (Herek et al. 1997).

(7) Hate crimes are less likely than non-bias crimes to be reported to the police by the victims because of fear of retaliation by the perpetrators, post-traumatic stress, feelings of self-blame or powerlessness, mistrust of police or fear of retribution within the criminal justice system (Herek et al. 1999, Peek 2011).

Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for what causes hate crime, although as Craig (2002) convincingly argues, no existing theory can fully account for all types of hate crime because the contributing factors differ for each incident. As such, explanations for hate crime range from highly individualistic and psychological accounts, which examine the motives, traits and personality types of perpetrators (Bushman and Baumeister 1998, Craig 2002), to broader theories that explore the social, cultural, political and economic circumstances that often give rise to hate crime activity (Green, Glaser and Rich 1998, Green, McFalls and Smith 2001). Communities marked by extreme competition over scarce resources, economic downturns, population displacement, and high unemployment may experience higher rates of hate crime (Green et al. 2001). Scapegoating theory suggests that during such difficult times, some people choose to lash out against a convenient out-group, especially an out-group that is cognitively linked with the source of their anger or frustration (Allport 1979, Gerstenfeld 2002).

When widespread outbreaks of hate crime occur, there is typically a precipitating or triggering incident: the start of a war, a terrorist attack or other catastrophic event that outrages and instills fear in the broader public (Welch 2006, Peek 2011). During such times, populations that share the same racial, ethnic or religious background as the “enemy” of the state may be subject to stereotyping, harassment and hate crime (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). Levin and McDevitt (2002) classify these types of retaliatory incidents as “defensive hate crimes.” Defensive hate crimes are aimed against specific out-
siders—those who are regarded as posing a personal challenge or threat to a perpetrator’s physical well-being, community or entire way of life. Those who commit defensive hate crimes tend to rationalize that by attacking an outsider, they are in fact taking a protective posture, a defensive stance against perceived intruders or invaders. Most of the hate crimes that followed the 9/11 attacks would likely fall into this category. In the subsequent sections, we explore the scope and magnitude of post-9/11 anti-Islamic hate crime.

Methods and Data

Our analysis draws on FBI data available through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program from 1992 through 2012. We acquired this data electronically from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

The hate crime data in the UCR is compiled annually from reports by local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. These agencies voluntarily report hate crime either directly to the FBI or through their state law enforcement agencies. Because the reporting of hate crime is not mandated by law, the FBI regularly engages in targeted outreach and training with local and state law enforcement agencies to encourage the systematic and accurate reporting of hate crime. Due in part to these efforts, the number of agencies reporting hate crime to the federal government has steadily increased. For example, in 1992—the year the first FBI hate crime report was issued—only 51 percent of the U.S. population lived in jurisdictions with agencies that reported hate crime (FBI 1992). By 2001, the year the 9/11 attacks occurred, 85 percent of the population was covered by agencies that reported hate crime (FBI 2001). In 2012, 79 percent of the population was covered by a reporting agency (FBI 2012). As previously noted, this does not mean that all hate crimes that are committed

3. As of this writing, the 2012 data set is the last available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
4. The number of jurisdictions reporting hate crimes to the FBI fluctuates annually. Because of the voluntary nature of reporting, it is unclear whether these missing values indicate that no hate crimes occurred or that hate crimes were unreported in these counties. For example, in our geographic analysis of hate crimes from 1992 through 2009, 1,019 counties (nearly 32 percent of all counties) had missing values. States with the highest percentage of counties reporting no hate crime data through 2009 were Alaska (93 percent of its counties), Georgia (81 percent of its counties), Mississippi (76 percent of its counties) and Alabama (75 percent of its counties).
are actually reported by law enforcement officers or by the victims themselves. In fact, a special report by the U.S. Department of Justice, which analyzed National Crime Victimization surveys, found that the actual level of hate crime activity in the U.S. is probably 20 to 30 times higher than the numbers reported each year by the FBI (Harlow 2005). In addition to victims not self-reporting hate crime for the reasons described above, significant underreporting of hate crime results from disparate definitions in what constitutes a hate crime, discrepancies in individual agency data collection methods and a lack of compliance and agency nonparticipation in many counties and states (Hutson, Anglin, Stratton and Moore 1997, Torres 1999).

The available UCR data provides information on the agencies reporting hate crimes and specific details regarding each hate crime incident. The incident-specific data includes:

- **date** when the hate crime was committed;
- **location** where the hate crime was committed;
- **offense type** (i.e., specific offense committed that was motivated by bias, such as murder, aggravated assault, burglary, vandalism, etc.);
- **victim type** (i.e., who or what was the target, such as an individual, business, place of worship, government agency or the general public); and
- **bias motivation** reported according to the following categories for each hate crime offense—bias against **race** (anti-American Indian, anti-Asian, anti-Black, anti-white anti-multi-racial); **religion** (anti-atheist, anti-Catholic, anti-Islamic, anti-Jewish, anti-Protestant); **ethnicity** (anti-Hispanic, anti-ethnic other); **sexual orientation** (anti-bisexual, anti-heterosexual, anti-homosexual); **gender** (male, female); **gender identity** (transgender, gender nonconforming); or **disability** (anti-mental disability, anti-physical disability).

In this chapter, we focus specifically on anti-Islamic hate crime data in the pre- and post-9/11 periods. We made this decision for the following reasons. First, because the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks were quickly identified as Arab-Muslim men, and because of a decades-long history of anti-Islamic sentiment in the U.S., Muslims were widely targeted after 9/11. Second, although it has been well documented that many other religious and ethnic minority individuals were victimized after 9/11—most notably Arab Americans, who may or may not be Muslim, as well as Sikh Americans and other South Asians, Hispanics and various other persons who were simply perceived to be Arab or Muslim—we have no way of accessing data specific to these other groups (see Disha, Cavendish and King 2011, Soni 2013). The FBI includes no separate bias motivation category for anti-Arab incidents or anti-South...
Asian incidents. Thus, while our focus on anti-Islamic incidents clearly underestimates the magnitude of post-9/11 motivated hate crime, we are drawing on the only available FBI data on a specific group that was subjected to widespread post-9/11 backlash.

In the 21 years from 1992 through 2012, a total of 156,544 hate crime incidents were reported across the U.S. Of this number, 2,227 incidents (1.4 percent) were motivated by anti-Islamic bias. We analyzed these incidents by date and location of occurrence. For the purposes of this chapter, we aggregated the individual incidents to the county level. Because reports suggest that the most pronounced increase in hate crime occurred immediately after the 9/11 attacks (Welch 2006), we conducted additional analyses to identify incidents occurring one month before (August 11–September 10, 2001) and one month after (September 11–October 11, 2001) 9/11, as well one year before (September 11, 2000–September 10, 2001) and one year after (September 11, 2001–September 10, 2002) 9/11.

We also used county-level Muslim population estimates from the year 2000 to describe the relative risk that Muslims faced in terms of experiencing hate crime in different counties. This data was drawn from the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, which asked a nationwide sample of leaders from religious congregations to report the number of religious organizational members and total number of adherents based on baptisms and other records of religious rituals (see Jones et al. 2002). While obviously limited, these data provide the only available geographically specific estimate of Muslim adherents. We completed descriptive data analysis using Stata12 and used ArcMap10 from ArcGIS10 for geographic visualization of hate crime.

Results: Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Anti-Islamic Hate Crime

The following sections describe the consequences of 9/11 on patterns of hate crime against Muslims in the U.S. From our analysis of the FBI hate crime

---

5. Each hate crime reported could have more than one offense committed during the incident (e.g., vandalism and burglary). Incidents with more than one offense are a small minority (less than five percent) of all anti-Islamic incidents over the last 21 years. To an-
data, we identified six primary themes of interest. First, the 9/11 attacks generated a sudden rise in hate crime targeted at Muslims. Second, 9/11 has had an enduring effect on the prevalence of anti-Islamic hate crime. Third, anti-Islamic offenses against persons have been committed more frequently than offenses against property since 9/11. Fourth, intimidation, vandalism and simple assault were the most common offenses, but Muslims have been subjected to a number of different forms of post-9/11 hate crime. Fifth, since 9/11, anti-Islamic hate crime has become much more geographically dispersed throughout the U.S. These hate crimes do not always align with areas with large Muslim populations or areas where anti-Islamic hate crime had previously occurred in the pre-9/11 period. Sixth, the risk of experiencing anti-Islamic hate increased for all Muslims after 9/11; however, Muslims living in counties with smaller Islamic populations were at greater relative risk. In the subsequent sections, we present data that support these findings.

1. 9/11 Provoked a Sudden and Dramatic Increase in Anti-Islamic Hate Crime

Following 9/11, there was a rapid and substantial rise in the total number of anti-Islamic hate crime incidents across the U.S. In Figure 8.1, we compare the one month and one year time periods before 9/11 with those same periods after 9/11 to illustrate this spike in reported anti-Islamic hate crime. The total number of hate crimes targeted at Muslims in the month following 9/11 was 58 times the number reported in the month leading up to the disaster. This elevation in hate crime continued for the remainder of 2001 and through the first anniversary of the attacks with 14 times as many anti-Islamic hate crimes in the year following 9/11 compared to the year before (see also King and Sutton 2013).

Interestingly, and placing this anti-Muslim hate crime surge in context, anti-Black hate crime (consistently the most common motivation of all hate crimes in the U.S.) and anti-Jewish hate crime (consistently the most common hate crime motivated by religious bias in the U.S.) both declined in the year following 9/11. This suggests that the increase in crimes against Muslims was not part of an overall pattern of rising hate crime activity during this particular historical moment. Moreover, the proportion of all hate crimes that were identified as anti-Islamic increased from only one-half of one percent in the year before 9/11 to over six percent of all such crimes reported in the year after 9/11.
2. 9/11 Has Had an Enduring Effect on Anti-Islamic Hate Crime

Following the most serious increase in hate crime after 9/11, the number of reported anti-Islamic hate crimes declined. However, the fallout from the 9/11 attacks has had a clear and enduring effect on the incidence of hate experienced by Muslim Americans.

Figure 8.2 shows the yearly totals of anti-Islamic hate crimes in the U.S. from 1992 through 2012. During the pre-9/11 period, from 1992 to 2000, the yearly average of anti-Islamic incidents was 23. In the post-9/11 period, from 2002 to 2012, the yearly average was 143, which is over six times greater than before 9/11. The fact that anti-Islamic hate crime remains elevated over pre-9/11 levels, even a decade after the attacks, indicates a "new normal" of risk for Muslim Americans since the terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
3. Since 9/11, Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes against Persons Have Been More Common Than Those against Property

Hate crime can be any type of criminal offense that is motivated by bias; thus these crimes can be expressed against persons or against property. Accordingly, we divided anti-Islamic hate crimes into these two established FBI offense categories to better understand patterns of post-9/11 hate crime. We classified murder, negligent manslaughter, kidnapping, rape and sexual assault, robbery, intimidation, aggravated assault and simple assault as offenses against persons, and all other offenses including various forms of vandalism, theft, arson and financial offenses as crimes against property. While both forms of hate crime increased and remained elevated following 9/11, Figure 8.3 shows that hate crimes against persons increased more noticeably in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and have remained higher in the years since the terrorist attacks (see Cheng, Ickes and Kenworthy (2013) for a specific discussion of the prevalence of antireligious hate crime against persons and property).

Figure 8.3 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Offenses against Persons and Property, 1992–2012
4. Intimidation, Vandalism and Simple Assault Have Been the Most Common Forms of Post-9/11 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime

Hate crime can take many forms, and the UCR data includes 46 different offense types ranging from bias-motivated murder to shoplifting. Since 1992, the following types of hate crimes reported to the FBI—in order of frequency—have been perpetrated against Muslims: intimidation, vandalism, simple assault, aggravated assault, theft, arson, robbery, financial crimes (such as fraud and forgery) weapons violations and kidnapping and murder. But three offenses make up the overwhelming majority of all anti-Islamic hate crimes committed since 1992: intimidation (42 percent), vandalism (29 percent) and simple assault (16 percent). As illustrated in Table 8.1, these three forms of hate crime, and especially intimidation, increased markedly after 9/11 and have remained elevated in the years since.

5. Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Has Become Widely Dispersed Geographically since 9/11

The backlash that followed the 9/11 attacks led to an unprecedented number of anti-Islamic hate crimes that were geographically dispersed across the U.S. After 9/11, anti-Islamic hate crime spread to both densely and sparsely populated counties, to places with small numbers of Muslims and to areas with no prior experience with this type of hate crime.

Figure 8.4 shows the location of reported anti-Islamic hate crimes from January 1, 1992 through September 10, 2001. During this pre-9/11 period, anti-Islamic hate crimes were concentrated in 110 counties (or 3.5 percent of all counties in the U.S.). The figure also highlights the 10 cities and six states with the largest Muslim populations (see Jones et al. 2002, Logan and Deane 2002).

---

7. According to the Jones et al. (2002) data, Muslims lived in only 14 percent of all U.S. counties in the year 2000.

8. The ten metropolitan areas with the largest Muslim populations, in descending order, are: Los Angeles, New York City, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Orange County, Houston, Oakland, San Diego and Boston. In these ten cities, the estimated number of Muslims ranges from a high of 167,500 in Los Angeles to 37,200 in Boston (Logan and Deane 2002: 7).

9. The six states with Muslim populations greater than 75,000, in descending order, are: California, New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Texas and Michigan (Jones et al. 2002).
Table 8.1 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Offense Types, 1992–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Intimidation</th>
<th>Vandalism</th>
<th>Simple Assault</th>
<th>Aggravated Assault</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Kidnapping and Murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before 9/11, most anti-Islamic hate crimes occurred in metropolitan areas with the largest concentrations of Muslims such as in the cities of Los Angeles, New York City and Detroit. This result is predictable based on the theory of opportunity: the larger number of possible targets of hate (Muslims), the greater number of anti-Islamic hate crimes (see Disha et al. 2011).

Figure 8.4 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime, 1992–September 10, 2001, with Cities and States with the Largest Muslim Populations Highlighted

As illustrated in Figure 8.5, the pronounced surge in anti-Islamic hate crime following 9/11 rippled across the nation and into counties with smaller Muslim populations and areas with no previously reported anti-Islamic hate crimes. In the one year following 9/11, 567 anti-Islamic incidents occurred in 173 counties across 41 states. Of these 173 counties, 80 were estimated to have fewer than 1,000 Muslims (Jones et al. 2002).

In the eight years after 9/11, a total of 342 counties (or 10.9 percent of all counties) reported at least one incident of anti-Islamic hate crime. In Figure 8.6, we map all incidents of hate crime targeted at Muslims from 9/11 through 2009 and two trends appear. First, both areas with large and small Muslim populations continued to experience anti-Islamic hate crime in the post-9/11 period. This means that in the years following 9/11, anti-Islamic hate crime did not return to the pre-9/11 pattern of most incidents occurring in more heavily populated metropolitan areas with larger concentrations of Muslims (see also Disha et al. 2011). In fact, about 62 percent (213) of all the counties reporting an anti-Islamic hate crime since 9/11 were estimated to have fewer than 1,000 Muslims living in the county. Second, areas previously unaffected by
anti-Islamic bias also experienced backlash hate crime following 9/11. Over 75 percent (257) of the 342 counties reporting at least one anti-Islamic hate crime since 9/11 had not reported a single anti-Islamic hate incident in the years prior to the terrorist attacks.

Figure 8.5 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime in the Year after 9/11

Figure 8.6 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime from 9/11 through 2009
6. Since 9/11, the Overall Risk of Experiencing Hate Crime Has Increased for All Muslims; Those in Counties with Smaller Muslim Populations Experienced Greater Relative Risk

As we note above, the rise in anti-Islamic hate crime since 9/11 occurred in areas with large and small Muslim populations. To further investigate this finding, we use Muslim population data from 2000 to estimate anti-Islamic hate crime rates, which in turn allows us to understand the relative risk of experiencing bias-motivated crime for Muslims in different locations. We calculated hate crime rates as the county's number of anti-Islamic incidents divided by its Muslim population and multiplied by 100,000. Counties with no reported Muslims were removed from the analysis.

Figures 8.7 and 8.8 show the rates of anti-Islamic hate crime per 100,000 for the one year before and one year after 9/11. The data indicate that areas with smaller populations of Muslims have a higher rate of anti-Islamic hate crimes, meaning that Muslims in counties with few other Muslims are at greater relative risk of experiencing hate crime than those in counties with larger Muslim populations (see also Disha et al. 2011). For example, in the year following 9/11, Saginaw County, Michigan, where the estimated Muslim population in the year 2000 was only 77, had the highest anti-Islamic hate crime rate with 3,896 incidents per 100,000 Muslims. In comparison, Washington, D.C., which has an estimated Muslim population of just over 60,000, had the lowest rate of anti-Islamic hate crime at 1.65 incidents per 100,000 Muslims.

This result is intuitive in that even one hate crime in a county with a very small Muslim population means high relative risk. But comparing pre-9/11 anti-Islamic hate crime rates to post-9/11 rates shows that Muslims everywhere were at greater risk of experiencing hate crime. Across U.S. counties, the average rate of hate crime the year before 9/11 was 41 incidents per 100,000 Muslims—the average rate jumped to 254 incidents per 100,000 Muslims in the year following. Only three counties in the U.S. experienced a decrease in the anti-Islamic hate crime rate in the year following 9/11 from the year before (Tarrant County, Texas, Rockingham County, New Hampshire and Newington (Hartford County), Connecticut).

10. Interestingly, many of the counties with no identified Muslims in the population, at least according to Jones et al. (2002), actually reported anti-Islamic hate crimes after 9/11. It is highly possible, given the limitations and age of the data set and the associated problems...
Figure 8.7 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Rates in the Year before 9/11

Figure 8.8 Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Rates in the Year after 9/11

with accurately estimating the number of Muslims living in the U.S., that these victimized individuals were simply not enumerated in the Jones et al. (2002) study. They may have moved into the county in question after the Jones et al. (2002) data collection was completed. Unfortunately, these anti-Islamic hate crime cases had to be removed from the analysis because of the lack of available county-level Muslim population data.
Conclusion and Recommendations

Muslim Americans have endured decades of stereotyping, discrimination and violence, largely triggered by conflicts in the Middle East and acts of domestic and foreign terrorism associated (rightly or wrongly) with the Islamic faith (Said 1997, Shaheen 2001). However, 9/11—the most shocking and deadly terror attacks in the nation’s history—precipitated the largest-ever rise in anti-Islamic hate crime in the U.S. Much has been written about the post-9/11 backlash, but our analysis offers new insights regarding the short- and longer-term effects of the terrorist attacks on hate crime activity at the national level. Specifically, our findings reveal the following about anti-Islamic hate crime:

- Following 9/11, the onset of hate crime activity was swift and the increase in recorded hate crimes substantial.
- 9/11 has had an enduring effect on anti-Islamic hate crime in the U.S., with increased numbers of recorded hate crime representing a “new normal” for Muslim Americans.
- While all types of hate crime surged after 9/11, crimes against Muslim persons were more common than crimes against their property.
- Intimidation, vandalism and simple assault were the most common forms of hate crime directed at Muslim Americans both before and after 9/11.
- Anti-Islamic hate crime became much more geographically dispersed after 9/11, with hate crimes occurring in large cities as well as in more remote regions and areas that had previously been unaffected by such crime.
- Finally, the overall risk of experiencing hate crime increased for all Muslims after 9/11, although the relative risk was much higher for those individuals living in counties with fewer other Muslims.

These findings have important implications for professionals tasked with more effectively preparing for and responding to the social consequences of terrorist events. In the first place, the rapid onset of the post-9/11 backlash underscores the need for law enforcement personnel, emergency managers and other local leaders to identify potentially vulnerable populations and to conduct pre-disaster outreach to these community members. Muslims, Arabs and South Asians have historically been victimized during times of crisis and were especially at risk in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; hence, particular attention ought to be devoted to these minority groups. It should also be recognized, however, that other events that provoke blame and outrage could endanger different communities. Recall, for example, that African Americans and Jewish Americans are the most frequent targets of hate crime motivated by racial
and religious bias during non-disaster times. These and other marginalized groups could become scapegoats following future high profile events.

Grassroots organizations and advocacy groups representing minority communities represent useful starting points to identify and work with those vulnerable to post-disaster discrimination and hate crime. Waiting until an event happens may expose members of these communities to additional violence. Indeed, consider the following: From 1992 to 2000, there were 209 recorded anti-Islamic hate crimes in the U.S. In the month following 9/11, from September 11, 2001–October 11, 2001, there were 350 recorded anti-Islamic hate crimes. This post-9/11 one month count represents 1.7 times more anti-Islamic hate crimes than were perpetrated in the entire nine years prior to the terrorist attacks. Forging strong ties and building trusting relationships with minority communities before disaster strikes is essential to mitigating this type of backlash violence (Peek 2004).

In the second place, our findings underscore the importance of an enduring commitment to working with vulnerable populations as well as to educating the general public about the serious personal and social ramifications of hate crime. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, public officials and government agencies took many proactive steps to respond to the backlash. For instance, on September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution affirming the need to protect the civil liberties of all Americans and condemning bigotry against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights made a special hate crimes reporting hotline available, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission introduced a new category designed to track instances of employment discrimination against Muslims, Arabs, Middle Easterners, South Asians and Sikhs, the U.S. Department of Education issued a call for tolerance and respect in the nation's schools and universities and the U.S. Department of Justice created the Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash with the stated goals of reducing the incidence of bias-related attacks and ensuring that the perpetrators of hate crimes would be brought to justice (for a more thorough discussion of these initiatives, see Peek 2011).

These governmental efforts, as well as many others led by community- and faith-based groups, played an important role in stemming the most severe tide of hate crime that Muslims experienced after 9/11 (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). However, as our findings demonstrate, even years after the terrorist attacks, anti-Islamic hate crime remains well above pre-9/11 levels. In fact, the number of recorded anti-Islamic hate crimes in the post-9/11 period that we studied is nearly six times greater than in the years prior to 9/11. The persistent nature of the post-9/11 backlash highlights the need for local leaders and
governmental agencies to reaffirm their commitment to reducing bigotry and to promoting tolerance.

In the third place, law enforcement officials should be aware that post-disaster hate crime may take many different forms, from high-profile incidents to more insidious acts of hatred. In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims experienced a range of hate crime-related offenses, but they were most frequently subjected to bias-motivated intimidation, vandalism and simple assault. Knowledge of why hate crime occurs and how it may be expressed may help law enforcement agencies to target policing activities toward the most easily recognizable property and vulnerable members of minority communities. For example, police officers should be prepared for the possibility of backlash violence and be ready to patrol communities where at-risk minority groups live, businesses where they work, schools they attend and places where they worship in case of an emergency. They also should understand that other intersecting social identities or characteristics—such as gender, immigrant status, ethnicity and adherence to certain religious practices—may further influence the likelihood that any given Muslim or other minority group member could be targeted (Perry 2014). Law enforcement officers need to receive proper training in these ways to identify, investigate and classify hate crime incidents, while recognizing the various reasons why victims may be less likely to report this particular form of crime.

In the fourth place, law enforcement officers and emergency managers in communities outside of the areas directly impacted by a terrorist event need to be prepared to respond to post-disaster hate crime. Indeed, the retaliatory hate crimes discussed in this chapter differ from most other events and crime types covered in this book in that post-9/11 hate crime affected areas well beyond the disaster epicenters in New York and Washington, D.C. Moreover, the 9/11 attacks seem to have provoked a fundamental change in the geographic distribution of hate crimes and relative risk experienced by Muslims; before 9/11, anti-Islamic hate crimes were predictably concentrated in the metropolitan areas with the largest Muslim populations but after 9/11, counties with smaller Muslim populations and those that had never before recorded anti-Islamic hate incidents were among those places affected by the surge in post-9/11 hate crime. Following a terrorist attack, no community is immune from the potential for hate-related violence, no matter how far from the disaster zone. Thus, all professionals, including those working in places with less diversity, smaller populations and ostensibly less risk of direct experience with terrorism need to be vigilant regarding potential outbreaks of hate crime. Given the possibility of future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and the historical legacy of backlash violence against religious and ethnic minority groups following such events, law enforcement of-
Officials and emergency managers must better understand the dynamics of hate crime and be prepared to respond effectively and proactively to the likelihood of a hostile post-disaster response toward vulnerable populations.

References


State, and County Based on Data Reported for 149 Religious Bodies. Nashville, 
TN: Glenmary Research Center.

the temporal clustering of hate-motivated offending. Criminology 51(4): 
871–894.

Levin, J. and J. McDevitt. 2002. Hate Crimes Revisited: America’s War on Those 

Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional 
Research, University of Albany.


the World Trade Center Disaster: A study of corporate roles, functions, 
and interaction with the public sector. In Beyond September 11th: An Ac­ 
count of Post-Disaster Research, ed. J. L. Monday, Boulder, CO: Institute 

Peek, L. 2004. Backlash mitigation plan: Protecting ethnic and religious mi­ 
norities following a terrorist attack. The Journal of the American Society of 

Temple University Press.

Perry, B. 2014. Gendered Islamophobia: Hate crime against Muslim women. 
Social Identities 20(1): 74–89.

Quarantelli, E. L. 2007. The myth and the realities; Keeping the 'looting' myth 


Soni, S. K. 2013. Gauging the implications of the Wisconsin Sikh temple shoot­ 

Torres, S. 1999. Hate crimes against African Americans: The extent of the 

Welch, M. 2006. Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes and State Crimes 
in the War on Terror. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Zahran, S., T. O. Shelley, L. Peek and S. D. Brody. 2009. Natural disasters and 
social order: Modeling crime outcomes in Florida. International Journal of 
Discussion Questions

1. Why do you think terrorism and hate crime have been understudied and thus underrepresented in the crime and disaster literature? What other types of crime might warrant additional attention in disaster research?

2. How is hate crime defined? What types of bias or prejudice may motivate hate crime?

3. Why is it sometimes difficult to identify hate crime? How do law enforcement officers determine whether or not a hate crime has occurred? What other approaches might you suggest to most effectively identify and investigate a potential hate crime?

4. What features distinguish hate crime from other criminal activity? Why is hate crime often considered a special category of crime warranting enhanced penalties?

5. Why are hate crimes underreported by both victims and law enforcement? How does this affect the results of the research reported in this chapter?

6. Identify and explain the six key findings outlined in this chapter. What do these findings reveal regarding the scope and magnitude of post-9/11 anti-Islamic hate crime?

7. How does the outbreak of hate crime that followed 9/11 differ from most other disasters covered in this edited volume?

8. What recommendations do the authors offer for professionals engaged in preparing for and responding to terrorist events? What else would you suggest could be done to reduce retaliatory hate crime in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and other crisis events?
Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster aims to answer two questions: Why do some people take advantage of the disruption that disaster causes to commit crime, and what can be done about it? The third edition of Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster includes a complete updating of the chapters from the second edition and focuses on crime in the wake of recent disasters, including Hurricane Sandy, Typhoon Haiyan and the Ferguson riots. The authors of the essays in this volume, all talented sociologists, criminologists and law enforcement officials who have had direct experience researching and working in disaster conditions, have updated their original work to investigate the long-term effects that disaster can have on crimes such as rape, fraud, looting, domestic violence, hate crimes and even homicide. They have also worked to explain the actions criminal justice and other systems can take in the short and long-term disaster aftermaths to combat and prevent crime. The revisions to the third edition of Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster help bring us closer to a criminology of disaster and set the stage for new theorizing and research that can help us more fully understand the criminogenic effects of disaster and the best practices for criminal justice and other systems in preventing these effects.

Praise for the Second Edition of Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster

"The second edition of Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster provides a novel look at the various forms of crime that can develop during and after disasters. From street crime to elite crime and everything in between, the chapters provide solid data on the myriad social control challenges disasters present. Authors take on important topics in the field, such as the conditions under which post-disaster looting occurs, increases in violence against women that often accompany disasters and disasters that occur as the result of corporate crime. Many findings in the book call into question taken-for-granted assumptions about disasters and their effects, while others suggest important questions for further research."

— Kathleen Tierney, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder

"For decades researchers have often described the post-disaster environment as a ‘therapeutic community,’ a place where people come together and do whatever it takes to restore normalcy to their lives. While this pattern of prosocial behavior is common in many cases, the second edition of Crime and Criminal Justice in Disaster reminds us that there is also a dark side of disaster. For communities with unusually high crime rates, widespread poverty and rampant political corruption, disasters can sometimes make matters even worse. This timely and important book is extremely well-written and engaging. It contains contributions from many of the most widely known and highly respected scholars in the field, and it will be a valuable resource for courses in disasters and emergency management, criminology and criminal justice, sociology, political science, and public administration."

— Gary R. Webb, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas, former member of the Center for the Study of Disasters and Extreme Events at Oklahoma State University

ISBN 978-1-61163-739-7